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Let us assume that one party, A, represents another, B, if and only if A, with B's authorization, 
purports to speak or act for B. B may authorize A directly, or may authorize the rules under 
which A is selected to speak or act, and in either event the authorization may consist in a 
positive endorsement or in a failure to exercise a capacity to disendorse. Building on this 
assumption about the nature of representation, let us assume in addition that there is some 
dimension in which the representing party is supposed to be faithful to the represented party so 
that, depending on the degree of fidelity displayed, the representer may perform better or worse 
in the representational role: the degree of fidelity provides a criterion for judging the quality of 
the representation.  
These assumptions about the nature and quality of representation put important 
restrictions on the topic to be addressed here. Thus they mean that A may be statistically – or, 
more generally, descriptivelyi – representative of B without being a representer in our sense. And 
they mean that A may be an advocate for B without being a representer in that sense.ii But they 
still leave a large number of issues open. The relationship envisaged may vary in three more or 
less familiar ways.  
• It may be a relationship between one representer and one representee, or it may assume
the form of one-many, many-many or, at the limit, many-one representation. The one-
many representation is exemplified by the relationship of a member of parliament to a
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constituency; many-many by the relationship between congress and the people as a 
whole.iii 
 
• The dimension in which the representer is supposed to be faithful to the representee may 
be more or less constraining. The representer may just be expected to speak or act on the 
basis of her own best judgment; or, going to the other extreme, to act according to the 
preferences or judgments of the representee; or, in between, to act according to the 
representee's interests or values. The less constrained representer will count as a trustee, 
the more constrained as a delegate.iv  
• However fully authorized, the relationship may or may not give the representee a certain 
control over how faithful the representer is. Where there is representee-control, the 
factors that support it may include: a power of selection, a power of deselection, 
constraints on the process of representative action, constraints on the domain of 
representative action, and exposure to scrutiny and contestation.  
 
In this essay I want to introduce another respect in which the relationship of 
representation may vary. Representation may be responsive in character, as I put it, or it may 
rather be indicative. This distinction has been unduly neglected, because theorists have focused 
mainly on the responsive variety of representation, and this essay is designed to help correct the 
balance.v The discussion is in three sections. In the first, I present the distinction in an abstract 
form. Then in the second, I describe some ways in which indicative representation has been 
recognized, side by side with responsive representation, in the tradition of political thought. And, 
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finally, in the third section, I ask after the lessons that the recognition of indicative representation 
has for democratic politics today.  
 
1. The Basic Distinction 
Imagine that I am invited to take part in a committee – say, a University committee to inquire 
into how philosophy may be made as attractive to female students as to male. And suppose that I 
am unable to serve on the committee myself and am given the right to appoint a member in my 
stead. I accept the offer and think about who I should choose. Believing that the issue is 
important and trusting in my own values or interests, I want someone who serves in my place to 
reflect the same attitudes and to speak or act in a way that is faithful to those attitudes.  
In this situation I might want to put someone on the committee who will be responsive to 
my wishes as to how the job should be done: someone who will serve as my deputy. In that case, 
I will look for a relationship in which I can make those wishes known and exercise some control, 
say by having the representer consult me. The wishes to which I want to make the representer 
responsive may be more or less constraining. I may just have a wish that the person should take 
time and trouble over the committee work, displaying suitable procedural interests or values in 
the committee's decision-making.vi Or I might wish that the person should further certain 
substantive rather than procedural interests or values, supporting decisions of a particular 
character. Or I might wish, even more constrainingly, that the person implement my instructions 
on every vote and every decision. 
But this is not the only way in which I might seek to be represented on the committee. 
Instead of seeking to install a responsive deputy, at whatever level of constraint, I might opt for 
having someone on the committee who shares my general attitudes, whether on procedural or 
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substantive matters, and is likely to vote accordingly. I will not expect this person to be 
responsive to me. I may be happy that she does not know what my attitudes are or even know 
that I nominated her. I will choose her as a representer because her mentality is indicative of my 
own. Where she is led in her judgments and decisions, I would be likely to be led, if I were on 
the committee. Or so at any rate I believe.  
This form of representation, like the other variety, would give me a certain control over 
the committee’s reflections and decisions. The representer will not be a responsive deputy, ready 
to track what I think, whether on procedural or substantive matters. But, if I have chosen well, 
she will be a reliable indicator of my general attitudes and of where or how I would go on 
particular issues, were I a member of the committee. I exercise a certain control through her 
insofar as I chose her for the prospect that she will reflect my attitudes. We might describe her as 
an indicative proxy rather than a responsive deputy.  
The control that I exercise in either of these cases might be increased, of course, with the 
help of other devices. The control I wield by courtesy of the responsive deputy or the indicative 
proxy will be increased if I have the power of de-selection as well as selection. And it also likely 
to be increased if the committee is constrained in a manner that guards against wayward 
influences. Thus the representative may be forced to make her decisions in a process of salutary 
interaction with certain other bodies or officials. Or she may be subjected to appropriate limits on 
the domain of committee action. Or she may be required to defend her decisions under public 
scrutiny and interrogation. And so on through a number of possibilities.  
The essential difference between responsive and indicative representation is easily stated. 
In responsive representation the fact that I am of a certain mind offers reason for expecting that 
my deputy will be of the same mind; after all, she will track what I think at the appropriate level. 
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In indicative representation things are exactly the other way around. The fact that my proxy is of 
a certain mind offers reason for expecting that I will be of the same mind; that is what it means 
for her to serve as an indicator rather than a tracker. From the point of view of my being 
represented on the committee, having someone there who reflects my mind, it really does not 
matter whether the representer is a reliable tracker or indicator. This may not even matter from 
the point of view of my having some control over the committee. Given a power of selection and 
any of a number of other devices, I can exercise control via the presence of the deputy or the 
proxy. Either figure can give me a presence on the committee, as we say; either can re-present 
me.  
The distinction between responsive and indicative representation is not my own 
invention, though it hasn’t been explicitly invoked in the political domain and the terms in which 
I am drawing it are relatively novel. It parallels a distinction in epistemology between two ways 
in which my beliefs may be reliable: that is, reliable representers of the world they depict. They 
may be reliable trackers of facts about the world, so that if such and such is the case, then it is 
likely that I believe such and such. Or they may be reliable indicators of worldly facts, so that if I 
believe such and such then such and such is likely to be the case.vii  
Just as beliefs may relate in either way to the facts they purport to represent 
epistemically, so representers may relate in either way to the representees that they purport to 
represent in a political fashion. It may be the case that if a representee has such and such 
attitudes, at whatever level of grain, then the representer may be expected, in response, to speak 
and act on those attitudes. Or it may be the case that if the representer speaks and acts on certain 
attitudes, at whatever level of grain, then the representee may be assumed, given an indicative 
status, to hold those attitudes. In the first case the attitudes held by the representee are the causal 
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source of the attitudes displayed by the representer; in the second, the attitudes displayed by the 
representer are a non-causal sign of the attitudes held by the representee. The faithful representer 
in the first scenario will be reliably responsive to the representee; the faithful representer in the 
second will be reliably indicative of the representee.  
 
2. The Distinction in Political History  
The staple examples of representation that are given countenance in political theory are almost 
all cases of responsive representation. Pride of place is given to the representation of a 
constituency by a member of congress or parliament, or the representation of a people by its 
legislature or executive, and both are responsive, electorally controlled relationships. 
Government is to be a government of responsive representers: that is, a government of 
individuals who are elected to track and respond to their constituencies. And at the same time it 
is to be a responsively representative government: that is, a government whose electorally 
disciplined judgments and decisions are supposed to respond to the country as a whole, reflecting 
public values and opinions.  
But where does the idea of indicative representation appear in politics? Where is it 
recognized in the tradition of political thought? And where does it have application in political 
institutions? 
Three metaphors have dominated the political tradition of thinking about the meaning of 
representation. Quentin Skinnerviii has recently argued that two of these, associated respectively 
with the courts and the theater, provide an answer to the responsive idea of representation. As the 
attorney acts under the explicit or implicit direction of a client, so the idea is that political 
representers might act as delegated deputies, under the explicit or implicit direction of their 
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representees. And as the actor constructively interprets the mind of a character, so the idea is that 
representers might serve as trustee deputies in interpreting and enacting the mind of representees. 
But the third metaphor identified by Skinner is drawn from representation in the pictorial arts, 
and it maps onto indicative representation. As the painting is indicative of how the subject of the 
painting looks, so on this image should representers be indicative of representees; they should be 
fitted to serve as proxies, not – or not just – as deputies.  
The idea of indicative representation figures early in democratic theory, since it is the sort 
of representation that is achieved or is likely to be achieved under the lottery system that was 
favored by the Athenians and that also played an important part in later regimes like those of the 
Italian city republics.ix This lottery system might be taken as a version of the technique of 
random sampling but random sampling put to use in the service of advancing goals espoused by 
the people as a whole. While it may have been motivated by a desire to have a regular turnover 
in the representer body, the important thing from our viewpoint is that it would have ensured a 
degree of proportional and indicative representation.  
The indicative idea also appears in the jury system, as that was developed in medieval 
Europe.x To be subjected to the judgment of one’s peers, whether in determining that there is a 
legal case to answer, or that one is legally liable, is to be exposed, not to a random arbiter – a 
chance enemy, perhaps – but to a body that stands in for the community as a whole. The idea is 
that the jurors should represent a cross-section of the community or at least of the fully 
enfranchised members: in medieval Europe, the mainstream, propertied males.xi  
The indicative image of representation is particularly evident in those parliamentarian 
writers in England of the mid-seventeenth century who look for a “speaking likeness” of the 
people in those who rule them, “describing Parliament as a “representation” – a picture or 
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portrait – of the body of the people.”xii And, perhaps as a result of that precedent, it became an 
established element in the thinking of those associated with the American war of independence 
and the French revolution.  
Thus Melanchton Smith could write in 1788, in opposing the American constitution: 
“The idea that naturally suggests itself to our minds, when we speak of representatives is, that 
they resemble those they represent; they should be a true picture of the people.”xiii Again, the 
idea was powerfully endorsed in a speech given by Mirabeau to the French Constituent 
Assembly in January 1789, though he used the image of a map rather than a picture to get it 
across. According to this version of the model, “a representative body is to the nation what a 
chart is for the physical configuration of its soil: in all its parts, and as a whole, the representative 
body should at all times present a reduced picture of the people – their opinions, aspirations, and 
wishes, and that presentation should bear the relative proportion to the original precisely as a 
map brings before us mountains and dales, rivers and lakes, forests and plains, cities and 
towns.”xiv  
With the growth of electoral machinery, the indicative idea was naturally applied to 
elections for the legislature, providing support for making the electoral system more and more 
proportional.xv Is it also behind the practice of organizing the legislature around geographically 
dispersed districts? It is hard to believe that it did not play some role in justifying that practice 
but the evidence, according to Andrew Rehfield,xvi is against this hypothesis. Still, districting 
does induce a similarity in one dimension – nowadays a fairly unimportant one – between the 
population as a whole and the legislature that represents it. 
The indicative idea survives in the continuing enthusiasm for proportional representation 
and has been given new life in campaigns for supplementing electoral representation with novel, 
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statistically representative bodies. It is there in the general policy of organizing citizens’ juries 
that would review various policy issues.
xviii
xvii And it is present in the notion of the deliberative 
opinion poll that is chosen as a random sample and then canvassed for its view on one or another 
issue at two separate times: first, before members of the sample make contact with one another, 
and, second, after they come together to receive background information, to hear different points 
of view and to debate the right line to take on the issue under consideration.   
A particularly striking example of this general device appears in the Citizens’ Assembly 
that was recently established in the Canadian province of British Columbia.xix A more or less 
representative sample of 160 citizens was assembled and given the task, over much of 2004, of 
reviewing the existing electoral system in the light of various hearings and discussions, and 
making a recommendation on whether or not it should be amended. The group recommended a 
change that then went to referendum and won more than 50% support but fell short of the quota 
required to trigger a change.xx  
 
3. The Lessons for Contemporary Politics 
As this review suggests, the main form of recognition that has been traditionally given to the 
distinction between the two forms of representation – and, in particular, to the role of indicative 
representation – is associated with the drive for proportionality in elected legislative bodies. John 
Stuart Mill, in particular, made this a centerpiece of his democratic philosophy and it continues 
to be a cause that is pushed in political theory.xxi  
A first lesson of the discussion so far, however, suggests that this one area where there 
has been some emphasis on indicative representation is ill selected. Given the different bases of 
responsive and indicative representation, it is not at all clear that the two modes can be usefully 
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mixed. And making an electoral, purportedly responsive body into a body that is also indicative 
of the population represented may prove to be a hopeless task.  
In order to serve as an indicatively representative body, a legislature would have to meet 
two conditions. First, it would have to be statistically representative, embodying a range of 
attitudes that correspond distributively to those in the population at large. And second, its 
members would have to be disposed to act on those attitudes, reaching conclusions that we might 
expect the population as a whole to reach, could it operate in a single deliberative assembly. The 
problem with making an elected legislature proportional is that while proportionality would 
make for fulfillment of the first condition, the fact that the body is elected is likely to militate 
against its fulfillment of the second.  
The reason for this possible failure is easy to see. The members of a body like the British 
Columbia Citizens’ Assembly are likely to vote as their independently determined attitudes lead 
them, in light of their deliberation, to do so. They have no ulterior motives that would warp this 
pattern and it is for that very reason that we can have confidence in the body; we may think that 
as they are led to vote so would the population as a whole have voted could they have assembled 
and deliberated appropriately. But this consideration is not going to apply with an elected body, 
at least if re-election is a possibility. For the members of such a body are likely to be moved, not 
just by the independently held attitudes that reflect the spread of attitudes in the community, but 
also by the desire to be re-elected – or for their party to be re-elected – and, more generally, by 
the desire to make a good impression on their supporters and on those who provide them with 
financial and other backing.  
But while proportionality may not help to make an elected body indicatively 
representative, is it likely to help in other ways: say, in establishing a body with which people 
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generally can identify as with a microcosm of their community? It may help in this way, but 
there is a countervailing consideration to put on the scales as well. This is that as an elected body 
becomes more and more proportional, there is less and less likelihood that any one party or close 
alliance of parties, and so any one package of policies, will prevail. But that means in turn that 
with every policy to be implemented there is likely to be a struggle between small groups, as the 
government seeks to buy off enough support to get a majority. The government in such a 
situation will certainly be a government of representatives – in Burke’s image, it may operate 
like a “congress of ambassadors” – but it may not be a very representative government. It may 
put forward a patchwork of policies, each customized to get a suitable majority, that represents 
an outcome of crude interest-group bargaining. The package may not answer to the values of the 
community, not having to be defended, as a whole, in terms that all treat as relevant to collective 
decision-making.xxii 
The first, tentative lesson of our discussion, then, is negative: making legislatures more 
and more proportional will not make them indicative and may have bad representative effects 
overall. But there are three other lessons that I am inclined to draw and they are more positive in 
character.  
The first of these lessons is that there is very good reason why contemporary democracies 
might make more use of devices like the British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly. Once we see that 
indicative representation is a bona fide mode of representation, subject to democratic control, the 
use of this sort of body comes to be very attractive. For clearly a government might make use of 
such bodies in a variety of contexts, taking their decisions, perhaps subject to approval in a 
referendum, as guides to legislation or even determinants of legislation. There are many very 
general issues that government faces where this mode of decision-making would be usefully 
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informed and representative and would carry unassailable democratic credentials. Any objections 
that might be made to the use of such a device ought to be silenced in light of an appreciation of 
the possibility of indicative representation.  
The second of the positive lessons I am inclined to draw is less radical but, paradoxically, 
may be more controversial. It is that once we have the notion of indicative representation on 
hand, we can see familiar, unelected bodies and authorities as indicatively representative and so 
as possessed in their own right of democratic credentials.  
Consider the electoral commission or commissioner who is charged with establishing the 
boundaries of electoral districts. Or the auditor general who is given the job of reviewing the 
government’s books. Or the bureau of statistics that has the task of making impartially derived 
statistics public. Or the ombudsman who provides an office for hearing and adjudicating various 
complaints about government administration. Or the central bank or federal reserve whose role it 
is to determine interest rates. Or indeed the judges whose brief is to interpret and apply the law 
impartially.  
In standard ways of thinking, such figures – such statutory officers, to use a Westminster 
term – are authorized because of their mode of appointment by responsive, elected 
representatives. But authorized to do what? This is a problem for standard theory. The salient 
answer, that they are authorized like regular bureaucrats to act as agents of the elected 
representatives, does not fit with the independence they are given. But an alternative answer 
becomes available once we have the idea of indicative representation on hand. This is that they 
are authorized to act, in suitable domains, as indicative representers of the people.  
In the areas where statutory authorities and bodies operate, it is fairly clear what the 
interest of the public is, by almost any criterion of public interest. And in these areas, the 
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appointment of people with a professional investment in serving that interest – and, ideally, with 
a virtuous disposition to further it – promises to serve the public well. Their inclinations ought to 
conform in general to the requirements of the public interest, at least if they have the virtues of 
good statisticians, good auditors, good judges, and so on. And so in the relevant domain of public 
interest, they ought to be reliable, indicative representers of the people at large.  
It may be said that giving representative power to statutory figures is a rash move, as it 
does not allow the people democratic control over their operation. But this is manifestly not so, 
for the virtue that would make them reliably indicative of the public interest can be strongly 
reinforced, even elicited, in a suitable institutional context. The individuals and bodies in 
question can be exposed to parliamentary, executive and popular contestation, constrained by 
rules for how and where they operate, dismissed for improper performance and subjected to a 
discipline of re-appointment. And in any case, they can be exposed to reputational constraints 
that give them a powerful personal interest in avoiding ignominy and winning esteem among 
their colleagues, and among the public in general.xxiii  
Can statutory authorities be seen, however, in a distinct, responsive light? Can they be 
depicted as representers who are responsive to the wishes of the people that they should conduct 
themselves in office according to a certain brief? This is not, in general, plausible, at least not 
with the sorts of statutory officers we are inclined to admire. Were they responsive representers 
of that stripe, then we should expect them to behave in this or that manner, depending on how the 
wishes of the people varied. But this is precisely what we would not expect of any statutory 
individual or body that we thought worthy of admiration.  
The third positive lesson that I draw from this discussion is that it is not just proportional 
bodies or statutory appointees who can count as unelected representers of the people. With the 
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category of indicative representation in hand, we also have to recognize the indicatively 
representative role of the whistle-blowers and complainants who expose abuses in public life or 
the private citizens who challenge and expose the unconstitutional character of certain laws. 
These are the “private attorneys general,”xxiv so called, who serve the public well by challenging 
certain laws before the courts, or indeed administrative policies before appropriate tribunals or 
officials. The fact that the public or people give such complainants a license to use the courts and 
tribunals as they do – and the fact that they often provide protection against various forms of 
retaliation – means that these figures are authorized to act in their characteristic manner. When 
they act, they do so under conditions that are laid down in laws that they public accepts and so 
they act under a suitable degree of public control. Did their action cease to serve the public 
interest, perhaps creating an intolerable nuisance in the working of the system, then presumably 
those laws would be changed.  
Private attorneys general serve the public well in the aggregate, acting on interests that 
converge with a manifest public interest. It may not be in the public interest that the law or 
policy challenged by such a figure is set aside or modified but it will certainly be in the public 
interest that there is the sort of interrogation of law and policy that private attorneys general 
trigger. Indeed this is routinely recognized in the way in which complainants often claim to be 
acting in the name of the people. Their authorization by the public means that like formally 
appointed officials, they can be seen as representers who are allowed to play their particular part, 
because of the indicative relationship between their dispositions and the presumptive dispositions 
of the people as a whole. 
These positive lessons should help to underscore the importance of recognizing that 
public representation may be indicative as well as responsive. Indicative representers may not be 
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elected but they are nonetheless important for that. Their democratic legitimacy is ensured by the 
fact that they are still subject to a significant degree of public control. And their democratic 
utility – indeed their democratic indispensability – is manifested by the unique way in which 
they can serve the public. The citizen assembly can provide a fine indicator of how the people 
would go on a certain issue, were they well informed; certainly it may provide a better indicator 
in many domains than the consensus among elected representatives. Statutory officers can 
provide a reliable determination of how the public interest is best served in areas where the 
interests of elected representatives can induce a self-serving instability. And private attorneys 
general can hold all other representatives, elected and unelected, to standards and interests that 
have a constitutional or other hold in the community. Democracy is too important to be left to 
elected politicians alone.xxv We need indicative as well as responsive representation in public 
life.xxvi  
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